Isolating Pakistan: Why Washington should avoid bashing Islamabad:
Does
it make sense for the Trump administration and Congress to try to
bludgeon Pakistan into doing Washington’s bidding? What about the
ultimate sanction of labelling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism? I
don’t think so, but my side of the argument is losing ground. And if
there is another major terrorist act in India or the United States that
can be traced back to Pakistan, this debate could well be over.
The
“squeeze Pakistan” camp is on the rise in Washington. There are three
major complaints, all of which have plentiful justification. The first
is Pakistan’s continued collusion with the Afghan Taliban, which has
taken the lives of US soldiers while taking aim at the government in
Kabul. The second is harbouring anti-India groups that carry out violent
acts against targets in India and Afghanistan. The third is the pace
and scope of its nuclear weapon-related programs, characterised by a
former senior official at the National Security Council staff and the
Pentagon as the fastest growing arsenal in the world.
Pakistan
has paid heavily for these choices, which are made in Rawalpindi and
not Islamabad. Its international standing has plummeted while India’s
has risen. Its ties with Washington have frayed badly while US ties have
shifted markedly toward India. Pakistan’s economic growth has
underperformed its natural potential, and foreign direct investment
(with the exception of China) has dwindled. Pakistan’s relations with
neighbouring states have deteriorated, and its diplomacy has been
shackled by talking points that lost persuasiveness many years ago.
In
addition, the Congress began to impose new penalties by cutting down on
the Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan and refusing to provide
financing assistance for the sale of additional F-16 aircrafts. More
needs to be done, according to a report by the Hudson Institute and the
Heritage Foundation, co-authored by Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis, who
argue:
The “squeeze Pakistan” camp is on the rise in Washington. There are three major complaints, all of which have plentiful justification.
“[T]he objective of the Trump administration’s policy toward
Pakistan must be to make it more and more costly for Pakistani leaders
to employ a strategy of supporting terrorist proxies to achieve regional
strategic goals. There should be no ambiguity that the US considers
Pakistan’s strategy of supporting terrorist proxies to achieve regional
strategic advantage as a threat to US interests.”
As for
the ultimate US sanction, Husain, Lisa, and their co-signatories
conclude that, “Designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, as
some US congressional members have advised, is unwise in the first year
of a new administration, but should be kept as an option for the longer
term.” The “longer term” of the Trump administration isn’t that long.
House
Foreign Affairs Committee hearings have become notable for Pakistan
bashing. One of the Committee’s senior Republicans, Ted Poe, provided
opening remarks at an event sponsored by hard-right-leaning American
Foreign Policy Council. The meeting’s topic: “The Appalling ‘Ally’: Has
Congress Lost Patience with Pakistan?”
My beef isn’t
with critiques of Pakistan’s behaviour. Clarifying the negative
consequences of Rawalpindi’s choices is essential, but the impulse to
isolate, stigmatise and punish Pakistan won’t produce the outcomes that
are best for Pakistan, India and the US. Among the losers will be those
inside Pakistan who seek changes in national security policies. Worse,
labelling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism would be a profoundly
unwise move. The leverage this threat provides would be lost with its
execution, along with the potential for remedial steps. The terrorism
issue, as important as it is, is less consequential than the nuclear
issue.
The Hudson/Heritage report and the anti-Pakistan
caucus on Capitol Hill reflect a broader trend: the impulse to punish
has grown, diminishing space for diplomatic initiatives. The tough
talkers forget about walking softly; they just brandish the big stick,
even at the cost of substantive engagement – and even when their
approach does not change the fundamentals of civil-military relations in
Pakistan nor dampen growing nuclear dangers.
Clarifying the negative consequences of Rawalpindi’s choices is essential, but the impulse to isolate, stifgmatise and punish Pakistan won’t produce the outcomes that are best for Pakistan, India and the US.
Full disclosure: I, too, have advocated clarifying penalties
for Rawalpindi’s choices, recognising that private demarches haven’t
worked. But neither will public witch trials. Herein lies the dilemma of
US diplomacy – and for all those who wish to preserve and improve ties
with Pakistan. Washington will lose more influence over Rawalpindi’s
choices than it will gain by wielding big sticks and raising the “state
sponsor of terrorism” threat like the sword of Damocles.
And yet, carrots don’t work, either.
There
is evidence of learning and change in some areas of Pakistan’s national
security – but not in others. Rawalpindi’s thinking has clearly changed
with regard to taking on former proxies, albeit selectively. A new
counter-terrorism campaign, Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, has begun which
widens the net, most notably in the Punjab. As with previous campaigns,
this one was forced by painful embarrassment and loss of life due to
weak implementation of prior commitments to fight extremism.
Pakistan’s
political and military leaders are now riding a wobbly bicycle. They
can either continue to move forward or fall behind. Falling behind means
failing to succeed in tackling Pakistan’s internal security and image
problems – and quite possibly inviting another near-war scenario with
India – if not worse. If Pakistan’s military and political leaders
continue to refrain from tackling men like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar,
their nation will remain stigmatised. Even so, continued engagement in
this domain is required, not righteous indignation, excoriation and
banishment. The rate of positive change depends on internal decisions
that are, in turn, shaped by external pressures. External pressures work
best when they don’t demand kow-towing to Washington.
Relations
between Pakistan and India, as well as between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, are volatile, as is evidenced by raids and firing across
unsettled borders. A major crisis between India and Pakistan could well
occur during Trump's administration. The US is obliged to function as an
effective crisis manager, which won’t happen by shunning Pakistan. How
do those leading the charge to squeeze Pakistan propose to proceed with
crisis management and war prevention?
Washington’s ability to change Pakistan’s national security policies toward Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons is limited.
Pakistan’s military leaders are making truly bad decisions
with respect to nuclear weapons. They are investing heavily in warheads
and missiles of last resort while trusting that deterrence will succeed
so that they will not have to use these weapons first in a war triggered
by incompetence or collusion with anti-India extremists based in
Pakistan.
Under these circumstances, Pakistan’s first
use of nuclear weapons on a battlefield – after seven decades of non-use
– will establish its pariah status beyond recall. Pakistan looses
either way: by believing that deterrence requires a nuclear competition
with India, or by believing that a breakdown in deterrence can be solved
by nuclear weapons’ use.
A recalibration of defense
expenditures – between nuclear weapons that Pakistan’s leaders dare not
use and conventional weapons that are Pakistan’s first line of internal
and national defence – can only be made in Rawalpindi. There’s no
telling how long it will take for Pakistan’s military leaders to figure
this out, but by trying to isolate Pakistan, Washington will only
reinforce the mistaken value Rawalpindi places on nuclear weapons.
As
for Afghanistan, the convergence of US and Pakistan interests does not
appear to extend beyond generalities, like the need for a political
settlement. Such nostrums break down where the rubber meets the road –
over the composition of a coalition government in Kabul, the contest for
influence between Pakistan and India, and the actions of the Afghan
Taliban, which Rawalpindi may again discover are beyond its ability to
control.
The missteps of both Pakistan and the US in
Afghanistan are already legion, the result of pipe dreams interrupted by
harsh realities. One of those pipe dreams is the belief that Pakistan
can be muscled into subordinating its perceived interests in Afghanistan
to those of the US. More convergence is possible if Rawalpindi can
rethink its Afghan strategy, but this heavy lift – as with trying to
change Pakistan’s open-ended embrace of nuclear weapons and its
anti-India policy – won’t occur by wielding a big stick.
Demanding
fundamental change in Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan ignores the
following logic chain: first, Pakistan is more strongly committed to its
policies in Afghanistan, however mistaken, than is the US; second, the
future of Pakistan is more important to the US than the future of
Afghanistan. Therefore, to sacrifice the former for the latter, as some
Pakistan squeezers and bashers demand, is folly.
So,
where does this leave US-Pakistan relations? In a bad place.
Washington’s ability to change Pakistan’s national security policies
toward Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons is limited. Carrots and
sticks work only at the margins. Pakistan can expect more penalties
unless its national security policies change in some respects. Change
for the better will come only if Rawalpindi changes course.
In
the meantime, Washington’s priorities are to stay engaged, clarify the
consequences of Pakistan’s present course, work on reducing nuclear
dangers during this period of intensified competition, and prepare for
crisis management.
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